AI Benchmarks

Confidence 0.90 · 9 sources · last confirmed 2026-06-13

Standardized tests used to compare AI models. The benchmark landscape in 2024 is shaped by rapid saturation of older tests, an explosion of new harder tests, and a methodological shift toward agent / reasoning evaluations. This page is an umbrella — individual benchmarks are listed here in a roster and get promoted to their own pages once they’re discussed standalone in another source.

Working definition

An AI benchmark is a fixed dataset + scoring function used to compare model performance under controlled conditions. Benchmarks live on a saturation cycle: introduced → models improve → benchmark saturates → harder benchmark proposed.

The 2024 wave is unusual in two ways:

  1. Speed of saturation. AI now masters new benchmarks within ~12 months of introduction (MMMU +18.8pp, GPQA +48.9pp, SWE-bench +67.3pp in one year).
  2. Methodological shift. Researchers are moving from static single-shot benchmarks toward agent benchmarks that evaluate trajectories under time budgets (RE-Bench), and toward reasoning benchmarks that resist pattern-matching (PlanBench, FrontierMath).

Key claims

2024: rapid benchmark saturation

Major one-year benchmark gains in 2024 (AI Index 2025 §2):

  • MMMU: +18.8 percentage points
  • GPQA: +48.9 percentage points
  • SWE-bench: +67.3 percentage points (4.4% → 71.7%)

2025: continued saturation, agent leaps, science benchmarks (AI Index 2026)

  • SWE-bench Verified: 60% → near 100% in one year (the same benchmark that was at 71.7% in 2024 has effectively saturated within two years of being introduced).
  • OSWorld (real computer tasks across operating systems): AI agents leapt from 12% → ~66% task success in one year. Agents still fail roughly 1 in 3 attempts on structured benchmarks.
  • IMO (International Mathematical Olympiad): Gemini Deep Think earned a gold medal.
  • Analog clock reading: top model only 50.1% correct — emblematic of the jagged-frontier (capability and incompetence on tasks of similar perceived difficulty).
  • ChemBench: frontier AI models outperform human chemists on average; below 20% on astrophysics replication, 33% on Earth-observation questions.
  • RLBench (robotic manipulation in software-based simulations): 89.4% success — but robots succeed on only 12% of household tasks in the real world.
  • Frontier-lab disclosure has dropped: independent testing does not always confirm what developers report.

New harder benchmarks (proposed because the old ones saturated)

  • Humanity’s Last Exam — academic test; top score so far: 8.80%.
  • FrontierMath — complex math; AI ~2% solve rate.
  • BigCodeBench — coding; AI 35.5% vs. human standard 97%.
  • PlanBench — logical planning; AI fails consistently even when provably correct solutions exist.
  • RE-Bench — agent evaluation: in 2-hour budgets AI scores 4× human experts, but humans win 2:1 at 32 hours.

Vantage / Executive LLM — benchmarking human skills, not models (Globerson et al. 2026)

A structurally different type of benchmark: assesses humans on durable skills (collaboration, creativity, critical thinking) using LLMs as both conversational teammates and autoraters. Methodologically distinct from PISA 2015 (scripted simulated teammates with multiple-choice answers) and ATC21S (human-human dyads in digital environments), both of which sat at narrow points on the validity-vs-rigor tradeoff.

  • Architecture: a single Executive LLM drives multiple AI teammates and steers the conversation to elicit observable skill evidence. A separate AI Evaluator scores transcripts against psychometric rubrics. Analogous to a computerized adaptive test (CAT), but for complex social/cognitive constructs rather than item-difficulty calibration.
  • Validation (large-N empirical): 188 US-based participants ages 18-25, 373 conversations. LLM-vs-human-rater agreement matches inter-human-rater agreement (Cohen’s κ ~0.45–0.64). For a downstream creativity task with 280 high-school students (180 held-out): Pearson r = 0.88 between Gemini autorater and human expert scores.
  • Models: Gemini 2.5 Pro (collaboration); Gemini 3 (creativity / critical thinking initial results).
  • Evidence elicitation: at conversation level with skill-matched Executive LLM, evidence rates of 92.4% (Project Management) and 85% (Conflict Resolution). Independent Agents (no steering) elicit significantly less. Telling subjects “focus on this skill” without LLM steering has no effect (p > 0.6) — the steering must come from the AI side.
  • Notable: the critical-thinking rubric explicitly evaluates how well participants use AI tools during the assessment — fact-checking, retrieval, stress-testing arguments. AI fluency treated as a sub-component of CT in 2026, not a confounder.

This expands the wiki’s benchmark roster from “fixed-task evaluations of model capability” to include scalable evaluations of human skills using LLM scaffolding. See durable-skills for the broader concept.

Task horizons (METR / Anthropic Economic Index, 4th report)

A complement to single-shot benchmarks: task horizons measure the duration of tasks at which an AI achieves a given success rate. METR introduced this measure; the Anthropic Economic Index applies the same lens to its own data.

For Claude Sonnet 4.5, the duration at which 50% success is achieved varies sharply by source:

Source50% success threshold
METR (fixed-task benchmark)~2 hours
Anthropic 1P API~3.5 hours
Anthropic Claude.ai~19 hours

Per the Anthropic report, the Claude.ai number is much higher because of selection bias (users bring tasks they expect Claude to succeed on) and task decomposition with feedback loops. The methodology gap is itself diagnostic — fixed-benchmark horizons and platform-observed effective horizons measure different things.

GDPval — economically-valuable tasks, win-rate vs human experts (GDPval, OpenAI, Oct 2025)

A structurally distinct benchmark that breaks the saturation cycle this page opens with. GDPval evaluates frontier models on real deliverables drawn from real expert work — 1,320 tasks across 44 occupations in the top-9 US-GDP sectors (~$3T wages), each built by an industry expert (avg 14 yrs) and tied to the actual time/cost to complete (avg 7 hours, up to weeks).

  • The metric is a non-saturating win rate. Rather than an accuracy score that tops out, GDPval grades model deliverables head-to-head against human-expert deliverables via blind expert pairwise comparison. Because the human baseline can be swapped for a stronger one over time, the benchmark “has no upper limit” — directly addressing this page’s “are we measuring what’s measurable?” debate by anchoring to economically meaningful output instead of test difficulty.
  • Result (Oct 2025): of GPT-4o / o4-mini / o3 / GPT-5 / Claude Opus 4.1 / Gemini 2.5 Pro / Grok 4, Claude Opus 4.1 was best — 47.6% of its deliverables graded wins-or-ties vs experts on the gold subset; performance improving roughly linearly over time; frontier models approaching expert deliverable quality. Model personalities: Claude strong on aesthetics/file-formatting (.pdf/.xlsx/.ppt), GPT-5 strong on accuracy/instruction-following.
  • Capability is steerable — more reasoning effort, more task context, and better scaffolding all lift scores (a general self-check prompt cut PowerPoint formatting errors 86%→64%, drove multimodal self-inspection 15%→97%, +5pp win rate). An empirical echo of the agent-harness thesis. This is the wiki’s first benchmark whose primary contribution is economic realism rather than reasoning difficulty — complementary to the capability-reliability framing below (Narayanan’s point that capability ≠ deployment is exactly why GDPval grades real deliverables, and why a 47.6% capability figure is not a 47.6% labor outcome).

Agentic-evals frontier — capability-reliability gap, scaffolds, living benchmarks (HF Agentic Evals Workshop, March 2026)

A 108-minute multi-speaker workshop (Hugging Face) that reframes the benchmark conversation for agentic systems. Four orthogonal moves to track:

  1. The capability-reliability gap (Narayanan / Princeton). “AI agents have been crushing capability benchmarks. If you believe this hype, companies should be replacing people with agents left and right. That doesn’t seem to be happening.” The gap, Narayanan argues, is reliability — not whether the agent can do the task on its best run but whether it does it consistently. His team decomposes reliability into 12 sub-dimensions, most of which are unsolved. Two of the twelve are roughly solved; the others remain barriers. Examples named in the talk: calibration on messy vs clean processes (models infer answer-correctness from trajectory noise), behaviour under ambiguous questions (deliberately included in GAIA-2 because real deployments hit ambiguity all the time), hallucination under data-unavailability injection. A public Reliability Index will track the 12 metrics across releases. The wiki should track this alongside automation-vs-augmentation — Narayanan’s release-decision claim is that automation deployments require a higher reliability threshold than augmentation deployments.

  2. Scar fragmentation (Habib / Hugging Face). Different sources report different scores on the same benchmark — because the scaffold, prompt, harness and runner vary. “Every time there’s a new model coming out, you look at the evaluation page and you see they evaluated a bunch of models, but it does not match previous reported scores on those models — and probably the next release is not going to match it either.” The diagnosis undercuts naive benchmark-as-ranking interpretation. Habib’s response is community-eval — a Hugging Face Hub-native mechanism for publishing benchmarks as living versioned artefacts with the eval framework bundled (uvx inspect_ai), community-maintained via PRs. The hub becomes an eval-environment store, paralleling its model store role.

  3. GAIA-2 and the ARE simulated environment (Andrews / Meta). The architecture for evaluating multi-app, multi-turn, state-mutating agent tasks reproducibly: apps (in-environment services with API surfaces over Python/MCP/CLI), universes (initial states of bundles of apps with synthetic personas, past emails, calendar events), scenarios (tasks layered on universes, including injected events during the task). GAIA-2 ships 1,000 scenarios across 10 universes using ~11 apps; five capability splits — execution, search, adaptability, ambiguity, agent-to-agent collaboration. The sim-to-real gap is explicit: simulation buys reproducibility/observability/safety/cost; it costs realism.

  4. The eval-reporting metadata layer (Ghosh / Hugging Face). A 171-release study of model-developer transparency: first-party social-impact and environmental-cost reporting has collapsed since 2022–23 (<15% of releases now mention labour and environmental effects; Google and Meta both pulled back). Third-party evals (METR, Apollo Research, Mor) have risen in both quantity and quality. HF’s response is every-eval-ever — a unified open schema + a public dataset of every first- and third-party evaluation across heterogeneous source formats. Independent third-party evaluation is paramount given declining first-party transparency.

Benchmark roster (mentioned in this wiki, awaiting standalone pages)

BenchmarkDomainStatus as of AI Index 2025
MMLUMultitask languageSaturated; U.S./China gap closed to 0.3pp
MMMUMultimodal understandingNew (2023); AI gained 18.8pp in 2024
GPQAGraduate-level reasoningNew (2023); AI gained 48.9pp in 2024
SWE-benchReal-world codingNew (2023); AI 4.4% → 71.7% in one year
HumanEvalCode completionSaturated; near parity U.S./China
MATHCompetition mathSaturated; near parity U.S./China
GSM8KGrade-school mathSaturated
MedQAClinical knowledgeOpenAI o1 = 96.0% (state-of-art); approaching saturation
HELM SafetyRAI / safetyNew 2024; for responsible-ai
AIR-BenchRAINew 2024
FACTSFactualityNew 2024
SimpleQAFactualityNew 2024
Hughes Hallucination Evaluation ModelFactualityUpdated 2024
HaluEvalFactualityFailed to gain widespread adoption
TruthfulQAFactualityFailed to gain widespread adoption
Foundation Model Transparency IndexDisclosure / governance37% → 58% Oct 2023 → May 2024
Chatbot Arena LeaderboardPairwise human preference EloTop-2 gap 0.7%, top-10 gap 5.4%
Humanity’s Last ExamAcademic generalistNew 2024; top score 8.80%
FrontierMathAdvanced mathNew 2024; AI ~2%
BigCodeBenchCodingNew 2024; AI 35.5% vs. human 97%
PlanBenchLogical planningAI consistently fails
RE-BenchAgent / time-budgetNew 2024; 4× humans @ 2hr, humans win 2:1 @ 32hr
Vantage (durable-skills)Human skill assessment via LLM scaffoldingNew 2026 (Globerson et al., Google Research); LLM autoraters match human raters; Pearson 0.88 vs experts on creativity tasks
GAIA-2 (on ARE)Agentic multi-app multi-turn evaluationNew 2026 (Andrews et al., Meta); 1,000 scenarios / 10 universes / 11 apps; five capability splits incl. ambiguity and agent-to-agent
Reliability IndexCross-release reliability trackingNew 2026 (Narayanan/Robons, Princeton); 12 sub-dimensions of reliability; living tracker
GDPval (GDPval)Economically-valuable real-world tasksNew 2025 (OpenAI); 1,320 tasks / 44 occupations / 9 GDP sectors; non-saturating win-rate vs human experts; Claude Opus 4.1 best at 47.6% wins-or-ties; gold subset + grader open-sourced

Debates and supersession

  • Are we measuring what matters or what’s measurable? Benchmarks gain complexity faster than tasks gain real-world specification. Open question whether the saturation race is sustainable, or whether the field is overdue for a different evaluation paradigm.
  • Agent benchmarks vs. static benchmarks. RE-Bench’s two-time-budget result suggests static benchmarks can mislead on real workflows. Future evaluations will likely emphasize trajectories, not single-shot scores. But agent evaluations are themselves harder to standardize — open question whether the field can converge.
  • Reasoning benchmarks. The IMO/PlanBench split suggests current models are good at patterns of math but bad at symbolic reasoning where verifiable solutions exist. Open question for the generative-ai roadmap, and load-bearing for safety in high-stakes deployments.
  • Methodology stability. Many of the highest-impact 2024 benchmarks (MMMU, GPQA, SWE-bench) are <2 years old. Year-over-year claims about “AI improvement” depend on stable benchmark methodology — worth flagging when sources cite trend lines without examining benchmark drift.
  • Capability vs reliability — released 2026 by Princeton. Capability benchmarks measure best-run performance; reliability measures consistency. The two are orthogonal. The wiki’s existing roster is heavily capability-skewed; the Reliability Index + 12 reliability sub-dimensions is the proposed corrective. Open question whether the field adopts the orthogonality framing in 2026.
  • Scar fragmentation — released 2026 by Hugging Face. Naive cross-release benchmark comparisons are unreliable because scaffold/prompt/harness varies. Community-eval (versioned, hub-native, framework-bundled, PR-maintained) is the proposed corrective. Open whether community-eval scales — empirical adoption signal needed 6–12 months out.